This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between corporate governance and firm liquidity in the Chinese stock market. Each year we construct a measure of overall quality of governance based on publicly available information for each firm listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) over the 1999-2004 interval. After accounting for other liquidity-related factors, we present strong evidence that the level of corporate governance is positively related to firm liquidity. An increase of 1% in corporate governance index (total 100%) is on average associated with 1.2% increase in a firm"s annual turnover ratio over the subsequent year. Results from examinations of subindices of corporate governance provide further support for the positive governance-liquidity relation. These findings have important implications for academics to investigate the value of enhancing corporate governance, and for regulators to promote corporate governance reform.
Introduction
There is substantial evidence that corporate governance rules or governance practices at country levels are associated with the development and strength of financial markets, namely, higher levels of governance are related to larger securities markets, more frequent IPOs, lower costs of external finance, and higher value of minority shares (La Porta et al., 1997 Porta et al., , 1998 Porta et al., , 2000 Porta et al., , 2002 Berkowitz et al., 2001; Lambardo and Pagano, 2000; Gompers et al., 2002; and Beck et al., 2003) . Researchers have also shown that within-country variations in corporate governance practices affect firm value. Black (2001) finds a strong correlation between a governance index and share prices of Russian firms. Durnev and Kim (2003) document that high scores of Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) corporate governance index and the S&P disclosure index predict higher Tobin"s Q for a sample of 859 large firms in 27 countries. Gompers et al. (2003) use the differences in takeover defense provisions to create a corporate governance index for U.S firms, and find that firms with stronger shareholder rights have better operating performance, higher market valuation, higher sales growth, and are more likely to make acquisitions. Black et al. (2005) report that corporate governance is an important factor explaining the variations in market value of Korean public companies. Cheung et al. (2008) document a positive relation between the corporate governance index and various measures of firm performance in the Hong Kong stock market.
Corporate governance aims at resolving conflict of interests between managers and shareholders and between large shareholders and minority shareholders, and thus mitigates agency costs. Financial transparency, operational transparency, and information disclosure are extremely important elements of corporate governance. Firms that adopt poor corporate governance practices are usually associated with a low level of financial and operational transparency, and low quality of information disclosure, which implies great information asymmetry and low firm liquidity. Botosan (1997) shows that an increase of a firm"s disclosure reduces information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. Lang and Lundholm (1999) report that a higher level of transparency and higher quality of disclosure are associated with lower information risk and smaller transaction costs. As a result, liquidity providers, such as market makers and outsider investors (in electronic trading system), will take actions to protect themselves by enlarging bid-ask spreads or limiting market participation. Several studies have also documented that some particular aspects of corporate governance affect firm liquidity. For example, Jain (2001) shows that bid-ask spreads are narrower in countries with better shareholders" rights. Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) document that firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange that are based in the U.S. exhibit higher liquidity than those based in outside the U.S. Attig et al. (2003) find that deviations of ownership from control increase bid-ask spreads in the Canadian stock market. Brockman and Chung (2003) show that liquidity costs are lower for the Hong Kong-based blue chips than for the China-based firms, suggesting that better investor protection (for blue chips in Hong Kong) is associated with higher liquidity. More recently, Chung et al. (2010) examine the relation between transparency-related governance attributes and liquidity in the U.S. stock market, and find that firms with better governance structure exhibit narrower quoted and effective spreads, smaller price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading.
However, there has been no study examining explicitly the relation between overall quality of corporate governance and firm liquidity. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the cross-sectional relation between overall corporate governance and firm liquidity using individual firm data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Based on the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence in the finance and economics literature, we construct a measure to evaluate the overall quality of governance using governance practices-related information of listed companies disclosed in their annual financial reports. After accounting for other liquidity related factors, we report strong evidence that the level of corporate governance index is positively related to firm liquidity in the subsequent year. An increase of 1% in corporate governance index (total 100%) is on average associated with 1.2% increase of a firm"s annual turnover ratio over the subsequent year. We also construct two subindices of corporate governance based on governance attributes in board structure and ownership structure respectively, and show that both the subindices of corporate governance are positively related to firm liquidity.
The positive relation between corporate governance and firm liquidity has important implications for academics. Empirical studies that utilized various corporate governance indices have shown that corporate governance is positively associated with firm value or stock returns (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2004) . Studies of asset prices and liquidity document a negative relation between stock return and liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002) . The negative return-liquidity relation implies that firms with higher liquidity have lower costs of capital, and as a consequence, higher firm value, lower required returns from investors. Therefore, our results suggest that the value creation role of corporate governance reported in the extant literature tends to be underestimated. Our empirical findings also have implications for market regulators to promote corporate governance reform. A common concern is that corporate governance reforms may dampen market liquidity (Bhide, 1993) . Our findings imply that maintaining good corporate governance is beneficial for firms in terms of both value creation and liquidity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the hypothesis relating corporate governance to liquidity. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. The final section concludes.
Hypothesis Development
Extant researches have shown that firms adopting poor corporate governance practices are usually associated with a low level of financial transparency and operational efficiency, and low quality of information disclosure. Therefore, poor corporate governance practices intensify information asymmetry problems between insiders and investors, increase the probability of trading against informed traders, and increase the likelihood of wealth expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Leuz et al. (2003) show that governance provisions improve financial transparency by mitigating management"s incentive and ability to distort information disclosure. Ajinkya et al. (2005) report that more effective boards enhance the quality and frequency of information released by management, and therefore, companies with more effective boards issue more frequent and accurate earnings forecasts. Bebchuk et al. (2005) show that governance provisions help to protect shareholder interests and limit the extent to which management expropriates firm value through shirking, empire building, and perquisites. Diamond (1985) demonstrates that increased disclosure reduces both the precision of private information and the incentive for private information search. A decrease in information asymmetry between management and investors tends to reduce investors" incentive to acquire private information, resulting in less heterogeneity in investor beliefs and smaller speculative position of informed traders. In such an environment, liquidity providers or uninformed traders face smaller adverse selection problems in the stocks, resulting in narrower bid-ask spreads and greater trading activity. Therefore, extant literature suggests that poor corporate governance is associated with a low level of financial and operational transparency, and thus impairs stock market liquidity.
Several studies have examined the impact of cross-country differences in legal and regulatory environments on stock market liquidity. Jain (2001) investigates the relation between institutional design and firm liquidity. Although his study focuses primarily on variables under the control of exchange (i.e., the market making system), one relevant result is that bid-ask spreads are narrower in countries with better shareholder rights. Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) show that firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange that are based in the U.S. exhibit higher liquidity than those based in outside the U.S. Brockman and Chung (2003) examine the impact of investor protection on firm liquidity using a sample of blue-chips and China-based firms traded on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and show that liquidity costs are lower for the Hong Kong-based blue chips than for the China-based firms. They conclude that better investor protection (for blue chips in Hong Kong) is associated with higher liquidity. Chen et al. (2007) analyze the relation between S&P"s Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) rankings and liquidity of the constituent firms in the S&P 500 index, and report that T&D rankings are negatively associated with firm liquidity measured by the quoted half spread and the effective spread.
Focusing on within-country differences in governance provisions, Lambardo and Pagano (2000) provide evidence of an inverse relation between shareholder rights and required returns on monthly equity indices, which implies an inverse relation between investor protection and liquidity costs. Attig et al. (2003) show that deviations of ownership from control increase bid-ask spreads in the Canadian stock market. Chung et al. (2010) examine the relation between transparency-related governance attributes and liquidity in the U.S. stock market, and find that firms with better governance structure exhibit narrower quoted and effective spreads, smaller price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading.
Researchers have also argued that some of corporate governance mechanisms aiming at reducing agency costs can also depress firm liquidity. Large shareholders and ownership concentration provide more adequate internal monitoring, but reduce stock liquidity by creating information asymmetry problems (Coffee, 1991; Bhide, 1993) . Heflin and Shaw (2000) report that a higher level of blockholder ownership, regardless of whether the blockholders are managers, is associated with reduced firm liquidity. Conversely, liquidity discourages internal monitoring by reducing the costs of "exit" of unhappy shareholders, and thus impairs corporate governance. Kahn and Winton (1998) contend that market liquidity can undermine the effective control by large shareholders by giving them excessive incentives to speculate rather than to monitor. Bolton and Thadden (1998) develop a simple model to show that when a firm decides to set up a controlling block, it reduces the number of shareholders who can participate in the trading of the firm"s stocks, and therefore, this effectively reduces market capitalization and hence, the liquidity of the stock.
The finance theory does not appear to provide a definite answer for the relation between the overall quality of corporate governance and firm liquidity. In this study, we hypothesize that overall corporate governance is positively related to firm liquidity in the emerging Chinese stock market for the following reason. The Chinese stock market has a short history, the quality of disclosure is low, boards are often inefficient, and information asymmetries between insiders and small investors are severe (Chakrararty et al., 1998) . This is consistent with Akerlof"s (1970, p.497) observation that "markets in underdeveloped countries often strongly reflect the operation of Lemons Principle."
Better governed firms can assure more efficient operations of corporate boards, better protection of minority shareholders" interests, and maintain more appropriate disclosure and better transparency. Therefore, the major hypothesis of our study is posited as higher quality of governance decreases information asymmetries, enhances investor confidence, and is positively associated with firm liquidity.
Data and Methodology
Our sample consists of all non-financial listed companies traded on the Shanghai Stock <Insert Table 1 
about here>

Measuring corporate governance
In contrast to most corporate governance indices that are based on responses to survey questions (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black, 2005) , we construct an overall governance index for each Chinese listed firm to measure the quality of corporate governance based on disclosed governance-related information in their annual financial reports. Bai et al. (2004) also use a similar approach to construct a corporate governance index and examine the relation between the corporate governance index and firm value for individual Chinese listed firms in 2000. We classify the governance related information into 5 groups: expropriation of minority interests, board of directors" structure and process, supervisory board structure and process, ownership structure, and financial transparency and disclosure. We score a variable if it contributes to the quality of corporate governance based on the finance and economics literature. These 5 groups consist of 17 variables in total.
1 The details of each variable and the scoring criteria are summarized in Table 2 .
<Insert Table 2 However, we recognize that there is no theoretical guidance on the weightage of each variable in the construction of corporate governance index. Therefore, we use the equal-weight technique to assess the quality of governance in this study. Bai et al. (2004) use a similar approach to construct corporate governance index, and examine the relation between overall corporate governance and firm values.
Empirical method
The relation between corporate governance and firm liquidity is estimated using the fixed effect panel regression. This method accounts for potential endogeneity of corporate governance measure 1 In addition to the governance provisions of Bai et al. (2004) , this paper also considers tunneling motivated related part transactions, board size, state as the controlling shareholder, institutional ownership, attendance rate of annual shareholders" meeting, and audit opinions in the construction of corporate governance index.
by controlling for potential unobservable firm-specific factors that could be driving both governance and liquidity. Our empirical model is specified as
where LIQ i,t is a liquidity measure for firm i in year t; CGI i,t-1 denotes firm i"s corporate governance index in year t-1; and X j,t denotes the jth control variable; λ i denotes the firm-level fixed effect.
There is still a concern regarding the endogeneity problems in the examination of the relation between corporate governance and liquidity. It is arguable that market liquidity affects corporate governance because greater liquidity makes it easier for active shareholders to build positions so as to effect changes in corporate policies. Moreover, market liquidity allows for the more effective use of secondary equity market for corporate-control activities. We attack this issue by examining the relation between liquidity and lagged corporate governance index as specified by equation (1).
Following the literature, we choose firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and volatility (VOL) as control variables in this study.
We use two commonly used measures of liquidity. The first liquidity measure is the tradable turnover ratio (TURNOVER), which is defined as the average of monthly turnover ratios for a firm during the year, and monthly turnover ratio is the number of shares traded in the month divided by total tradable A-shares outstanding at the end of previous month. 2 We use tradable turnover rather than total turnover, which is the number of shares traded in a month divided by total shares outstanding, because a large portion of shares (state shares and legal-entity shares) in a typical Chinese listed company is not allowed to trade.
Consequently, total turnover can be a distorted measure of liquidity in the Chinese stock market (Wang and Chin, 2004) .
The second measure for liquidity used in this study is the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its trading volume averaged over a given period. This measure was proposed by Amihud (2002) , which is termed as Amihud ratio (AMIHUD) hereafter. Intuitively, the Amihud ratio can be interpreted as the daily stock price response associated with one dollar of trading volume, which is consistent with Kyle"s (1985) 
where D is the number of trading days in a year for firm i.
Empirical Results
Summary statistics and contemporaneous correlations between these variables are presented in Table 3 . The average corporate governance index (CGI) is 0.46, with a standard deviation of 0.07.
The mean monthly turnover ratio over the 1999-2004 interval is as high as 27.4%, which means that it takes about 4 months for tradable shares of a firm to change hands once. This figure is comparable to that documented in Wang and Chin (2004) but is significantly higher compared to that in the U.S market, which is, for example, about 4% in Lee and Swaminathan (2000) . The Amihud ratio that is multiplied by 1,000 has a mean of 46.79, and appears highly volatile, with a standard deviation of 126.81.
Logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for the firm size (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . The mean SIZE of our sample is 21.05. The average leverage and book to market ratio are 0.51 and 0.35 respectively over the sample period. The mean monthly return volatility (VOL) is about 24.95%.The right-hand-side panel of Table 3 shows the contemporaneous correlations between the dependent and independent variables.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 4 . The key finding in Table 4 is that corporate governance index is significantly associated with liquidity. For the turnover regression, the estimated coefficient for CGI is 0.097 (t= 3.28) when all control variables are included. This implies that an increase of 1 CGI point (out of 100), the monthly (annual) turnover ratio of a firm will be increased by 0.1% per month (1.2% per year) in the subsequent year, on average. For the Amihud (illiquidity) ratio regression, the estimated coefficient for CGI is -0.972 (t= -2.26) when all control variables are included. The results in Table 4 are consistent with extant findings that better governed firms are associated with higher financial and operational transparency, less information asymmetry, and thus higher liquidity (Botosan, 1997; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Chen et al., 2007 , Chung et al., 2010 . Consistent with the literature, firm size is positively related to liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) , leverage and book-to-market are negatively related to liquidity (Perotti and von Thadden, 2003; Lang and Lundholm, 1999) . These results hold true when both the turnover and the Amihud ratios are employed as the dependent variables. There appears to be a positive relation between turnover and volatility, however, the positive liquidityvolatility relation does not exist when the Amihud ratio is used as a measure of illiquidity. The estimated coefficients for AMIHUD are of wrong signs, although they are insignificantly different from zero.
<Insert Table 4 about here> We also explore the relation between subindices of corporate governance and firm liquidity. An examination of subindices of corporate governance serves as a robustness test of the relation between overall governance and liquidity because one may concern that some of governance variables themselves may be the determinants of liquidity, for example, ownership and ownership concentration. 3 We construct two subindices: the board of directors-based index and the ownership structure-based index. The subindex is constructed by first summing the scores of individual variables and then scaling the scores using the number of non-missing variables for each group. The governance provisions related to board of directors are less likely to be the determinants of or affected by liquidity than those related to ownership structure. The results of regressing liquidity on lagged subindices of corporate governance are reported in Table 5 . To contain space, we only report the regression results using turnover as the liquidity measure. 4 Consistent with the results in Table 4 , the coefficient estimates for subindices of corporate governance are positive and significant at the 5% level or higher for all regressions, and the estimated coefficients for control variables are all of expected signs and statistically significant.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the cross-sectional relation between overall corporate governance and firm liquidity in the Chinese stock market. We employ a corporate governance index to measure overall quality of corporate governance for each firm traded on the Shanghai and the Shenzhen stock exchanges over the 1999-2004 interval. The index contains 17 governance elements, which uses, to our best knowledge, the most information available publicly in the construction of corporate governance index in the Chinese stock market. We find a positive and significant relation between corporate governance and firm liquidity after accounting for factors influencing firm liquidity. An increase of 1% in corporate governance index is associated with a 1.2% increase in a firm"s annual turnover in the subsequent year. We also examine the relation between subindices of corporate governance and liquidity and between individual corporate governance elements and liquidity. We report that both ownership structure-based and board of directors-based governance indices are positively related to firm liquidity; 12 out of 17 corporate governance elements are positively associated with firm liquidity.
This paper appears to be the first study to investigate the relation between overall corporate governance quality and firm liquidity. Our results have important implications for academics to better understand the benefits and costs of corporate governance. Extant literature has documented that the level of corporate governance is positively associated with firm value or stock returns. Our findings on the positive relation between corporate governance and firm liquidity imply that the value creation effect of corporate governance reported in the extant literature tends to be underestimated. Our findings also have implications for stock market regulators to actively promote corporate governance reform. The positive relation between overall corporate governance and liquidity relieves the concern that enhancing corporate governance dampens liquidity (Coffee, 1991; Bhide, 1993; Bolton and Thadden, 1998) . Table 1 Descriptive statistics
The sample period is from 1999 to 2004. The number of firms is computed at the end of each year. The SHSE and the SZSE denote the Shanghai and the Shenzhen stock exchanges respectively.
Table 2
Measuring overall corporate governance Table 3 Summary statistics (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) CGI denotes the corporate governance index. AMIHUD is the Amihud ratio that is computed based on Equation (2), which is multiplied by 1,000. TURNOVER denotes monthly turnover ratio that is the number of shares traded in the month divided by total tradable A-shares outstanding. SIZE is the logarithm of the firm"s total assets at the end of year.
LEVERAGE denotes the leverage ratio that is computed as the total debt scaled by total assets. MB is market to book ratio.
VOL is the monthly return standard deviation in a year. **, and *** indicate the significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. Amihud ratio (AMIHUD) respectively. Turnover is defined as the average of monthly turnover ratios for a firm in year t, and monthly turnover ratio is the number of shares traded in a month divided by total tradable A-shares outstanding at the end of year t-1. CGI is the corporate governance index of a firm. SIZE is the logarithm of the firm"s total assets at the end of year t-1. BM is the book to market ratio where the market value is measured using the share price at the end of year t-1 multiplied by total shares outstanding. Leverage is measured as the total debt over the total assets at the end of year t-1. 2004. Turnover is defined as the average of monthly turnover ratios for a firm in year t, and monthly turnover ratio is the number of shares traded in the month divided by total tradable A-shares outstanding at the end of year t-1. SIZE is the logarithm of the firm"s total assets at the end of year t-1. VOL is the monthly return standard deviation in year t. BM is the book to market ratio where the market value is measured using the share price at the end of year t-1 multiplied by total shares outstanding. Leverage is measured as the total debt over total assets at the end of year t-1. EX and INDUSTRY are dummies variables for the 2 stock exchanges and 12 industries respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the z-statistics computed based on the White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
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